Abstract: The authors show that integrity protection as a technical means towards automated teller machine (ATM) security is not enough to establish trust towards ATM users. The attacks, aiming at getting into possession of users' bank card details and personal identification numbers (PINs) are manifold. The authors come up with a solution that allows users to establish trust into the ATM integrity protection being in place. The users' mobile phones play a central role in the trust establishment. The authors also shift the PIN entry away from the possibly insecure ATM's PIN pad towards the users' mobile phones.
Introduction
In 2009, a spectacular case of automated teller machine (ATM) fraud took place in Russia and Ukraine [1] . The particular of this case was the course of action taken by the defrauders to attack ATMs at large scale -they employed a 'software integrity violation'. Although there are some known software manipulations of ATMs targeted at stealing money [2, 3] , this is the first case that was published in which malware was set up on ATMs to grab user data. The main question was 'who' could carry out such a sophisticated so-called 'offline attack' where direct access to the system computer that works within the ATM is needed. It is assumed that the attack was carried out by an insider who worked at the bank and who had legitimate access to the ATM.
Nowadays' ATMs are protected against network attacks as well as against attacks from insiders that have access to ATMs -while in operation -for maintenance work, for example, to install security patches. We classify those kinds of attacks as 'online' attacks. More precisely, we define an online attack as an attack that takes place 'after' the operating system (OS) has been started.
However, there is no protection against offline attacks. An offline attack is performed in a state in which the system is not running, or prior to the start of the OS. All the attacker needs is (physical) access to the system computer to target an ATM's 'integrity' and to circumvent all software protection mechanisms in place. The insertion of a boot compact disc (CD) or an universal serial bus device containing a live OS after switching on the ATM and booting that system suffices to circumvent the online protection software by manipulating the corresponding files. After a reboot to the genuine OS, all protective mechanisms are out of service.
The question that remains is 'who' is able to perform an offline attack against ATMs. As discussed above, direct access to the system computer working within the ATM is needed. It turns out that local bank administrators often have available such access. Thus, we are facing 'insiders', like bank administrators or even ATM technicians, who might turn bad and violate the software integrity of an ATM. The Russian case, as discussed above, shows that the presumption of malicious 'insiders' is not so far-fetched.
An ATM is not trustworthy in the users' eyes. There is no authentication or integrity proof of an ATM towards the user prior to the usage. A user cannot know whether an ATM was positioned by a trustworthy party, that is, a bank, and whether its software is still uncompromised.
We will come up with an integrity protection scheme for ATMs in Section 3. The manufacturer server is periodically informed about the ATM's current system state and puts the machine out of operation remotely in case of an integrity violation. However, putting an ATM out of operation means showing a text like 'this ATM is temporarily out of order' on the display. An insider could still reboot the machine and start a fake OS from a Live CD -enabling the attacker to drive users into using the compromised ATM. The ATM manufacturer is indeed informed about the integrity violation, but as the ATM is 'assumed' to be out of order, a technician might not be sent to the ATM immediately. An attacker could also attach a whole new fake display on top of the original one to fool customers.
Our main contributions in this paper are:
present the integrity protection in Section 3 before we come up with the trust establishment mechanism towards the users in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate our concept. Related work is covered in Section 6 before we conclude and give an outlook in Section 7.
System model and requirements analysis
We propose an integrity protection concept that allows banks and the ATM manufacturer to have up-to-date information about the system states of their ATMs -to be able to put a machine out of operation in case an integrity violation is noted. Moreover, we show how the users' mobile phones can be used to provide users with a proof that an ATM is secure to use. Based on that, the mobile phones can be used as PIN entry terminals for the authentication towards the ATM.
2.1 Attacker model 2.1.1 Attacker I: Such an attacker is able to carry out a skimming attack against an ATM. We can assume that an attack carried out by such an attacker also involves spying out the user's PIN, for example, video surveillance, shoulder surfing or fake PIN pads come into question. This is basically the type of attacker that causes the most substantial harm for banks nowadays.
Attacker II:
A more skilled attacker is able, besides carrying out a skimming attack (attacker I), to compromise a user's mobile phone as well. The goal for the attacker is to spy out the user's PIN, which is now entered at his mobile phone and not at the ATM terminal which can be spied out much easier. An attacker may drive a user into installing a fake ATM application on his mobile phone. This could be done by sending a text message with a link to the download page that houses the fake application to the user. Such an attacker is limited in the scalability of an attack, although. Spying out the PIN entry directly at an ATM affects all the users. However, spying out the PIN entry on a large scale of users' mobile phones means for an attacker to compromise all of those devices separately.
Attacker III:
We assume that an 'insider' is able to reprogramme the software running on an ATM to log the customers' bank card details. Logging the PIN via a video camera or a fake PIN pad is also possible for such an attacker if the user employs the ATM's terminal to enter his PIN. Furthermore, the attacker has control over the output that is presented on the ATM's screen. If the bank or the manufacturer puts an ATM out of operation -by presenting a 'this ATM is out of operation' sign on the screen -the attacker is able to present any other instruction, for example, a 'welcome! please enter your bank card.' message, on the screen.
Attacker IV:
The most highly skilled attacker, besides performing a skimming attack (attacker I) and an integrity violation (attacker III), is able to compromise the users' mobile phones as well (attacker II). He might succeed driving users into installing a fake mobile ATM application or some other application that includes input logging functionality. The first requirement means that if any component in the chain up to the OS has been tampered with, the boot-up must not succeed. With the second requirement, we ask for an accommodation of our concept to protect an ATM's integrity at the application level. If any malicious application is executed, the ATM should be put out of operation. To check the integrity of the running system, information about which applications have been executed is needed. The software versions of the applications also play a major role, for example, whether the latest updates are employed. The ATM has to communicate its up-to-date system state towards the manufacturer and the bank periodically to allow them to initiate a (remote) shutdown of the ATM in case of an integrity violation. Even if malicious bank administrators constitute an attack potential, we must not prevent a bank from setting up software on an ATM. It is a major requirement on the part of banks to be able to customise ATMs by setting up applications. Banks are asking for an 'ordinary' OS to reduce the expenditure for the installation of software or the presentation of advertisement. With our third requirement, we want to avoid that malicious programs -setup by a local bank administrator -can interfere with applications provided by the ATM manufacturer. Moreover, applications provided by the bank must not obtain access to the 'critical' ATM hardware devices at all.
We also 'provide users with proof that an ATM is secure to use and to prevent PIN logging for attackers'. We do not present a solution against skimming in this paper, but we show how we can harden ATM security in a way that skimming does not constitute a problem any longer. The user uses his 'mobile phone to check whether the ATM is secure to use'. The decision whether an ATM is secure to use depends on the ATM's integrity that is evaluated by the ATM manufacturer on a regular basis and communicated towards the user's mobile phone on request. The 'mobile phone is also used as PIN entry device' in our proposed concept. This means that the user authenticates himself towards the ATM, after identification via his bank card, by entering the PIN on his mobile phone. The entered PIN is then sent towards the ATM. † Req. IX: an ATM that is exposed to a skimming and PIN logging attack must not endanger the user's data if our solution is employed.
Integrity protection concept

ATM system architecture
The ATM architecture we propose is shown in Fig. 1 . There is no single OS any longer, but we have rather split up this system -according to its tasks -into three systems: the 'basic system', the 'manufacturer system' and the 'bank system'.
The trusted computing base (TCB), which is crucial for the whole system's security, is constituted by the virtual machine monitor (VMM), the basic system that sits on top of it, the trusted platform module (TPM) and core root of trust for measurement (CRTM), as well as the card reader, the encrypting PIN pad (EPP), and the cash withdrawal device.
Basic system:
The basic system is the privileged system, Dom0, that has direct access to the TPM. This system is not only responsible for providing the other virtual machines with virtual TPM instances (vTPMs) [4] , but it is also the basic system's task to perform remote attestation towards the manufacturer server and to decrypt and start the manufacturer system as well as the bank system if the ATM is not compromised. We assume that the basic system is a very specialised system with some exactly specified tasks. It does not need to provide too much functionality and updating the system is negligible, and thus we can omit the challenges that regular updates would involve. The system is encrypted by the ATM manufacturer and the key is 'sealed' to the state of the ATM as it is delivered -the ATM hardware components are part of the sealing properties as well. The key for the decryption, which is performed by the VMM, is only released by the TPM if the ATM is in the same state as during the deployment.
Manufacturer system:
The manufacturer system is a closed system that comprises the applications that provide the basic functionality of an ATM, for example, the cash withdrawal application. The basic idea of the introduction of this system is the separation from the bank system the bank administrators have access to. This system is the only one that obtains access to the EPP, the card reader and the cash withdrawal device. We propose to encrypt and authenticate all communication between the manufacturer system and those ATM hardware devices -the proper (sealed) keys to be released to this system only. Thus, we can prevent malicious software installed by bank administrators within the bank system from gaining access to the ATM hardware components. The manufacturer system is encrypted by the ATM manufacturer. The key for the decryption is released to the basic system by the manufacturer server after the remote attestation is being performed, as covered in Section 3.3.
Bank system:
The bank system is the one that bank administrators have access to and where they are allowed to install applications. Within this system, an online protection suite is installed to prevent illegal access. The bank system is encrypted by the bank that operates the ATM. The decryption key is needed by the basic system and it is released by the bank server as discussed in Section 3.3.
Manufacturer and bank server:
We introduce a 'manufacturer server' and a 'bank server' that closely work together. Those servers will be used by the ATMs to 'periodically' attest their system state to -allowing the manufacturer to check the current integrity of an ATM and allowing the bank to put a compromised ATM out of operation.
Integrity measurement
The integrity measurement is a task that takes place at different levels. First of all, the boot process up to the start of the VMM has to be measured. For that purpose, we employ the 'authenticated boot' mechanism provided by the trusted computing group (TCG). Moreover, we employ 'TrustedGRUB' [5] to measure the VMM as well. The VMM proceeds with measuring the basic system. Within the basic system, we employ the 'integrity measurement architecture' (IMA) [6] to take measurements of all programs that are executed. As the manufacturer system is started, basically the same measurement procedure -made up by authenticated boot and IMA -is performed within that system. The main difference for that system is that the hardware TPM platform configuration registers (PCRs) cannot be employed to store the hash values, but the vTPM PCRs have to be used instead. When it comes to the start of the bank system, the measurements are performed again. As part of this procedure, the files of the security suite that is executed within the bank system are also measured.
During the ATM's operation, we need proof that the security suite within the bank system is still running and that it is up-to-date. The security suite is the only application that is given access to the vTPM within the bank system -that is, the authorisation code for the vTPM is only known to this application. It is the application's task to periodically log an entry of the form current timestamp||software version and compose a hash aggregate in a PCR. The current timestamp is needed to prevent replay attacks and the information about the software version is needed as the security suite needs to be up-to-date at any time.
Integrity evaluation
The integrity evaluation, based on the measurements performed as discussed above, takes place at different levels. The first evaluation is performed during the execution of TrustedGRUB. If any file changes of the VMM are noted, the boot process is stopped. As the basic system is encrypted, we have to decrypt the system before it can be started, within the VMM. For that purpose, the VMM needs to request the release of the proper key by the www.ietdl.org TPM. As we have mentioned earlier, this key is sealed to certain PCR values.
In a next step, the evaluation of the basic system's integrity and the applications running within that system is performed. For that purpose, remote attestation towards the manufacturer server has to be performed. As the integrity evaluation up to this point has been performed locally -and the manufacturer server can rely on this fact, based on the TPM as the trust anchor -the list that is maintained by IMA and PCR-20, which protects the list from tampering with [6] has to be attested. With this approach, we have extended the chain of trust from the CRTM up to application level within the basic system. It is the server's task to go through the list and check the hash values of the executed software against a black-and white-list. If all programs that have been executed within the basic system are classified as 'good' and the comparison of the computed hash aggregate of those hash values against PCR-20 matches, the manufacturer server can list the ATM as being uncompromised.
After the first remote attestation of the ATM, the manufacturer server provides the ATM with the key to decrypt the manufacturer system. For that purpose, the server encrypts this key with a public key of the ATM whose corresponding private key is stored within the TPM of the ATM's system computer. Thus, only the TPM may decrypt the key for the decryption of the manufacturer system. The server may put the ATM out of operation remotely in case it detects an integrity violation and will at the same time list the ATM as compromised in its database. The integrity evaluation during the start-up of the manufacturer system is basically the same as the one during the start-up of the basic system. The system requires the TPM to release the keys for the communication with the ATM hardware devices and remote attestation is performed towards the basic system. Thus, it is the basic system's task to (periodically) evaluate the integrity of the manufacturer system. In case of a manipulation detection, the basic system informs the manufacturer server about the incident. For the bank system being able to get started, the basic system needs to obtain the proper decryption key from the bank server first. The bank server -assured by the manufacturer server that the ATM is uncompromisedprovides the TPM with the encrypted key. During the start-up of the bank system, TrustedGRUB, running within the bank system virtual machine, evaluates whether the security suite has been manipulated and stops the start-up in case of a compromise. Note that by checking the integrity of the security suite at this stage, we can later on rely on the integrity of the bank system as we can trust that the signs of life have been created correctly. The basic system periodically provides the bank server with the measurement log and the corresponding signed PCR value.
Trust establishment towards users
We suggest to introduce a second independent channel which allows the user to check the authenticity and integrity of an ATM. As we can assume that most people carry a mobile phone with them nowadays, we can employ the mobile phone to implement this independent channel. Moreover, we propose to use the mobile phone not only for the user to check the authenticity and integrity of the ATM, but also as a PIN entry device for the user -and thus, for the authentication of the user towards the ATM.
Integrity proof of ATM towards manufacturer server
The integrity proof of the ATM towards the manufacturer server is performed as explained in Section 3. The ATM provides the manufacturer server with an ATM certificate during remote attestation. This certificate is created and signed by the ATM manufacturer during the personalisation phase of the ATM prior to delivery and stored within the ATM. It comprises the ATM's identity and its Bluetooth address.
Furthermore, we introduce the issuance of an 'authentication ticket' -which also comprises information about the integrity of the ATM -by the manufacturer server. The ticket is issued for the ATM and looks as follows Auth.Ticket = Sig Man. − Server Private ; ATMstate ||ATM certificate||ts)
Note that Sig(X; Y) means that the private key X is used to sign the message Y. 'ATM state' is either 'compromised' or 'uncompromised', the 'ATM certificate' is the one that is submitted to the manufacturer server by the ATM during remote attestation, and ts denotes a timestamp to prevent the replay of old authentication tickets. Before the transmission to the ATM, the ticket is encrypted with the public key of the ATM whose corresponding private key is sealed to an ATM state of integrity. Thus, the authentication ticket can be accessed by the ATM only in a state of integrity. The integrity reporting and the corresponding issuance of the authentication ticket are performed on a regular basis so that the manufacturer server knows about the current ATM state and the user, as covered next, also obtains up-to-date ATM state information.
Authentication and integrity proof of ATM towards mobile phone
The mobile phone can be used to check the validity of the authentication ticket issued by the manufacturer server as presented above. The manufacturer server certificate is included into the mobile phone application. The certificate revocation check can be tunnelled through the ATM by employing the online certificate status protocol [7] .
The main question is how the mobile application receives the authentication ticket. We suggest that the ATM encodes the ticket, together with a nonce, into a matrix barcode and shows the barcode on its screen. The popular Aztec code [8] , for example, can store up to 2 kB of data, which suffices for the incorporation of the authentication ticket and a nonce. The procedure for the user to check the authenticity and integrity of the ATM is shown in Fig. 2 and is as follows. The user inserts the bank card into the ATM and takes a picture of the barcode that is then shown on the ATM's screen. The mobile application decodes the ticket, verifies the signature -with the known public manufacturer server key -and extracts the data from the ticket. Then, the timestamp is checked to ensure that the received ticket is up-to-date. The mobile application shows the user whether the ATM is secure to use.
Authentication of user towards ATM
If the authentication and integrity proof towards the mobile phone -as discussed above -succeeds, the mobile www.ietdl.org application allows the user to enter his PIN for the authentication towards the ATM.
The process of sending the PIN to the ATM is shown in Fig. 3 . The mobile application establishes a Bluetooth connection to the ATM. This is why we have included the ATM's Bluetooth address within the ATM certificate that the PIN is not transmitted in clear text, but is encrypted with the public key of the ATM which is also extracted from the ATM certificate. The ATM has to decrypt the data with the corresponding private key and encrypt the PIN with the currently used symmetric key before the encrypted PIN block can be forwarded to the PIN validation server to be checked. Note that the decryption of the PIN within the ATM's system computer does not constitute a security problem as the mobile application is assured beforehand that the ATM's system computer is uncompromised and thus will not log the PIN. Moreover, the private key and the symmetric key are sealed to a secure system state during the personalisation phase of the ATM. Thus, the TPM does not release those keys to a compromised ATM system.
The nonce, which is sent back to the ATM in this phase, is the one that is incorporated in the barcode presented by the ATM to the user in Fig. 2 . The ATM checks whether the returned nonce equals the one used for this ATM.
Evaluation of our concept
Security features
The introduction of an integrity protection prevents ATMs from being manipulated by insiders during an offline attack. If any files are manipulated, the ATM is put out of operation.
By introducing a second independent channel -besides the assumable 'untrusted' output of the ATM's display -we allow the user to check the ATM's authenticity and integrity before using the machine. The contact between the user's mobile phone and the ATM is established by first taking a picture of the authentication ticket shown on the ATM's screen. This is how the user establishes a direct connection with the ATM standing right in front of.
Data logging attacks
As we have presented a solution against data logging in this paper, we now focus on possible attacks against our scheme that target at logging users' data. Data logging can occur at different levels. We may classify the attacks into three different categories -according to the target they are aimed at. Attacks can be aimed directly at the ATM, against the user's mobile phone, or a combined attack against the ATM and the mobile phone is also possible. The attack tree shown in Fig. 4 points out the different attack vectors. Note that the edges shown in grey denote the attack vectors that target at both the ATM and the mobile phone. The different attack vectors are explained in more detail next.
Attacks against the ATM:
We can further classify attacks against the ATM into three sub-categories: 'skimming', PIN logging and 'integrity violation'.
'Skimming': skimming attacks are very popular attacks against ATMs. If there is no anti-skimming mechanism in place, our solution cannot prevent the data from being logged by a skimming device. An attacker who wants to use a cloned bank card has to grab the user's PIN as well.
'PIN logging': PINs are grabbed by micro cameras or by fake PIN pads on nowadays' ATMs. We have come up with a concept in this paper to mitigate the problem of PIN logging at an ATM by shifting the PIN entry from the (potentially) insecure ATM terminal to the user's mobile phone. Thus, the mobile phone should be employed by users as PIN entry terminal.
'Integrity violation': a compromised ATM is put out of operation by the ATM manufacturer. However, an attacker might still drive a user into using the machine by presenting a fake screen. At this point, the malicious software running on the ATM is able to log the user's bank card details.
Attacks against the mobile phone:
The attacks against the mobile phone can also be classified into further sub-categories according to the attacker's approach: 'trick user into setup of fake app, employ key logging software and grab PIN during transmission.
'Trick user into setup of fake app': an attacker could try to drive a user into installing a fake mobile application that resembles the original one and that allows logging the PIN when it is entered at the mobile phone. This attack requires that the user ignores any presented warnings regarding the failed certificate validation. If there is a vulnerability in the 'Employ key logging software': key logging functionality can be embedded into any (mobile) application. If the mobile OS does not ensure that only the original mobile application receives the entered PIN, then any key logging software running on the phone might read out the PIN. At this point, we rely on the underlying OS to ensure that input data is only forwarded to the application it is intended for. However, as we will see in the consideration of the 'combined attacks', even if the PIN can be logged by another application, it is quite hard for an attacker to draw any benefit from this attack.
'Grab PIN during transmission': as the PIN is transmitted on a wireless link from the mobile phone towards the ATM, it might be overheard by an attacker. However, the PIN is encrypted before it is transmitted. Thus, we rely on the security of the used encryption scheme at this point.
Combined attacks:
Now we focus on combined attacks, that is, attacks that both targets at an ATM compromise as well as stealing data from the mobile phone. In Fig. 4 , we have highlighted (edges shown in red and blue) two combined attack scenarios exemplarily. The scenarios mirror our concept presented in this paper. The compromised ATM is used to steal the users' bank card details, for example, we have argued that our solution cannot prevent skimming attacks.
'Large-scale attack': an attacker who violates the software integrity of an ATM to steal the users' bank card details must also drive the users into installing the fake mobile application to steal their PINs at their mobile phones. This is because the original mobile application would not accept the integrity-violated ATM's integrity proof, and thus would not allow the user to enter the PIN on the mobile phone. Furthermore, an attacker might not be able to initiate a large-scale attack -as it is the case with today's skimming and 'traditional' PIN logging attacks. It is hard for an attacker to compromise the mobile phones of those customers whose bank card details have been stolen at the compromised ATM. This attack scenario is shown in red in Fig. 4 .
'Data matching': data logging can occur at large scale both at the ATM, as well as at the mobile phone -however, isolated from each other. At the ATM, users' bank card details may be stolen via a skimming attack. Data logging may be employed at large scale at users' mobile phones if an attacker succeeded in embedding this functionality into a very popular mobile application. The point here is that the matching between the data -the bank card data and the PINs -is not an easy task for an attacker. There is no correlation between those data, that is, an attacker cannot know for sure which PIN fits which bank card details. This attack scenario is shown in blue in Fig. 4 .
Note that other combinations of attacks are imaginable as well. However, the same arguments as above apply for those scenarios.
5.3
Requirements evaluation † Req. I: an ATM must not start if its integrity has been compromised.
The key to decrypt the basic system is not released by the TPM if the chain of trust cannot be established, that is, if there is an integrity violation. 'Attacker III' and 'Attacker IV' cannot start a manipulated ATM system. They could only boot the ATM with a live CD. † Req. II: an ATM can be checked periodically by the manufacturer and the bank -whether the running system is still uncompromised.
The permanent integrity measurement carried out by the IMA and the corresponding remote attestation towards the ATM manufacturer and the bank, allows for the bank to know about the ATM's current state all the time. The bank is able to put the machine out of operation in case of an integrity violation. We cannot prevent the exploitation of security holes. Even if the systems are isolated from each other, a security hole within the VMM could have major impact on all the systems running on top of it. However, the report about the system and software configurations also contains information about the current patch-level of the system. Thus, an ATM that executes software that is known to contain security holes can be updated immediately. 'Attacker III' and 'Attacker IV' could interfere with the periodic check by disconnecting the ATM from the network -triggering an alarm at the bank server. † Req. III: applications provided by the bank must be isolated from applications provided by the ATM manufacturer.
We propose to have a basic system whose main task is the control of the other systems, that is, the provisioning of vTPMs for those systems. There is one system, the manufacturer system, that is provided by the ATM manufacturer and that only houses applications that provide the basic ATM functionality. The integrity of the manufacturer system is measured by the basic system all the time -not only during boot-up -and remote attestation towards the manufacturer is performed periodically by the basic system. In case of an integrity violation, the manufacturer informs the bank to put the ATM out of operation. Then, we propose a bank system that is 'open' for banks, meaning that bank administrators can customise the ATM by installing applications or presenting advertisement on the screen. Having built up a chain of trust up to this system, the bank knows that the security mechanisms are still in place and that they are up-to-date. None of the presented attackers have access to the applications provided by the ATM manufacturer. † Req. IV: applications provided by the bank must not obtain access to ATM hardware devices (EPP, card reader and cash withdrawal component).
We point out that the applications running within the manufacturer system are 'critical' as they require access to the EPP, the card reader and the withdrawal device -this system is the only one that obtains access to those devices. None of the applications provided by local bank administrators, running within the bank system, obtain access to the ATM hardware devices. None of the attackers obtain access to ATM hardware devices. † Req. V: 'the integrity proof, which is communicated towards the user, cannot be forged, that is, the authenticity and integrity must be maintained. Replay attacks with valid proofs must also be eliminated'.
The integrity proof is communicated towards the user's mobile phone via the ATM's screen. The advantage of employing the screen is that trust into this device can be built up this way as a fake screen could not present a valid integrity proof. 'Attacker I' and 'Attacker II' cannot anticipate the communication of the integrity proof. 'Attacker III' could communicate an invalid proof towards the user's mobile phone which would not accept the proof and identify the ATM as being compromised. 'Attacker IV' would not just be able to communicate an invalid proof towards the user's mobile phone, but he could also succeed in making the user believe that the ATM is uncompromised via a fake mobile application. † Req. VI: 'the PIN must be protected during the transmission from the mobile phone towards the ATM'.
The mobile application encrypts the PIN with the ATM's public key, which is extracted from the authentication ticket. 'Attacker I' cannot decrypt the transmitted PINgiven that the employed encryption scheme is secure. 'Attacker II' might intercept the PIN via a fake mobile application, but matching the PIN with a customer is not that easy. 'Attacker III' cannot decrypt the PIN as the TPM would not release the proper decryption key to the compromised ATM system. 'Attacker IV' could intercept the PIN as the fake mobile application might not encrypt the PIN before the transmission at all. † Req. VII: 'the mobile ATM application must not send the user's PIN to an integrity-violated ATM'.
Only 'Attacker IV' might succeed as only a fake mobile application would send the PIN towards an integrity-violated ATM. † Req. VIII: 'a compromised mobile phone must not constitute a threat to the customer's data'.
If only the mobile phone is compromised by 'Attacker II', the PIN is the only data that can be grabbed by such an attacker. 'Attacker IV' might grab the PIN as well as the bank card details at the ATM. However, it would still be a challenge to correlate the PIN with the grabbed bank card details for the attacker. † Req. IX: 'an ATM that is exposed to a skimming and PIN logging attack must not endanger the user's data if our solution is employed'. None of the attackers described in this paper are able to impersonate a customer by stealing the bank card details and the corresponding PIN. Even if the bank card details are stolen by a skimming device, an attacker cannot use those data as he lacks the corresponding PIN -which is 'secure' as long as the user does not enter it on an ATM terminal or on a compromised mobile application.
Related work
Stumpf et al. [9] present a concept for a trustworthy system architecture using virtualisation. They propose not to attest the whole system state but rather to attest trustworthy operations processes. For that purpose, they employ trusted virtual machines. Berger et al. [10] employ a mandatory access control policy, enforced by the VMM, to establish integrity protection in virtual data centres. In [4] , Berger et al. present a virtualisation approach for a hardware TPM based on Xen. Only the privileged VM obtains access to the hardware TPM and the vTPM manager running in this VM provides vTPMs to all the other VMs.
De Luca et al. [11] analyse PIN-based ATM authentication as well as other approaches by conducting a field study. One of their findings is that an authentication mechanism should minimise the possibility for users to reveal their PIN -as users often do not hide the EPP during PIN entry. Moreover, they find that an authentication scheme must be simple and must work even if users do not pay full attention to it. We believe that our proposal for a PIN entry on mobile phones fulfils those requirements. Roth et al.
[12] present a PIN entry method based on 'trapdoor games' that is resilient against shoulder surfing. The idea is that the ATM displays digits coloured black and white. In each round, the user has to press either the black button if the digit of the PIN is in the black set or the white one in the other case. Thus, knowing the PIN -which is the trapdoor -enables the user to win the game. De Angeli et al. [13] show that their 'visual identification protocol', a graphical authentication for ATMs, is not a practicable alternative to the widely used PIN authentication.
Our approach benefits from the use of secure mobile phones. Becher et al. [14] present a survey of mobile phone security, describing numerous approaches to improve the security of smartphones, for example, by trying to detect malware. Loo [15] provides a summary of security threats to mobile phones and lists recommendations for manufacturers, corporations and individual users. Both articles illustrate that current mobile phones can no longer be considered to be more secure than desktop PCs. However, they also show that, like on desktop PCs, there are countermeasures available. Although we do not think that any financial transactions should rely solely on the security of a mobile phone, the discussed threats are not severe enough to preclude usage of a phone in addition to another factor (like in our approach).
Conclusion and outlook
We improve state-of-the-art ATM security by introducing an integrity proof towards the 'user' and shifting the PIN entry towards the user's mobile phone.
The advantage from a non-technical point of view for the customers is that the authentication of the customer as proposed in our concept is still based on PINs. Thus, the customer is not confronted with any complicated www.ietdl.org authentication schemes. As most people carry a mobile phone with them and our application is quite straightforward, we think that the usability for the users is also alright.
Our scheme constitutes a practicable approach for banks to advance ATM security by keeping the two-factor authentication. Losses due to skimming can be decreased. The alternative for banks would be to employ biometrics at their ATMs -entailing high costs for the implementation and burdening their customers with a technology they would not want to use.
We have implemented the integrity proof towards the ATM manufacturer and the proof towards the user (in a slightly different way than discussed in this paper) on a state-of-the-art ATM. A user who is familiar with the developed mobile phone application is able to perform the integrity check of the ATM in approximately 2-3 s. We think that this time is acceptable in terms of usabilityknowing from a study by De Luca et al. [11] that the average interaction session with an ATM takes on average 46 s.
A trust model for e-commerce and a corresponding framework is presented in [16] by Komiak and Benbasat. In future work, it would be interesting to evaluate the trust of ATM users into our proposed scheme.
